In this study, we argue that the rules set by a central government to allocate interregional equalization grants may induce richer regions to ask for devolution, even when centralized provision is more ecient.
Introduction
Decentralization in decision making is a very controversial issue (Weisner, 2003; Oates, 2008; Weingast, 2009 ). In Europe, calls for devolution within countries (Thieÿen, 2003) coexist with a drift toward centralization of some relevant functions, such as scal policies (Tanzi, 2008; Vaubel, 2009; Tanzi, 2009 ). In developing countries, often decentralization is prioritised highly in political agendas (Weisner, 2003) , even though its eects on economic growth and regional income disparities remain a controversial issue (Barrios and Strobl, 2009; Sacchi and Salotti, 2013; Sorens, 2014) .
The mainstream economic literature suggests that decentralization may be justied by dierences in local preferences and asymmetry of information (Levaggi and Smith 1994; Levaggi and Levaggi 2011; Akai and Mikami 2006; Oates 2005) , while the political economic literature (Oates, 2005 ,Inman and Rubineld, 1997 , Hillman, 2009 , and Besley and Coate, 2003 shows that decentralized decisions are optimal in the presence of coalitions and bargaining in the decision making process.
In this study, we suggest the presence of another driving force and show how the choices made by a central government about interregional income distribution may induce richer regions to ask for devolution, even when this implies a reduction in total welfare.
We introduce an equalization grant within the framework proposed by Besley and Coate (2003) and compare welfare for two scenarios: (i) centralization, in which the provision is granted by the central government, and (ii) devolution, in which each region autonomously sets its expenditure level. As in Besley and Coate's model, we assume complete and symmetric information and no comparative advantage in local provision. As is well known, in such a framework, devolution is always suboptimal for the whole community (and, accordingly, expenditure should be decided by the upper government tier). However, wealthier regions may experience reductions in net regional scal ows (Ambrosanio et al., 2010) , and they may lobby for the devolution of this function, even if, at social levels, their benets are compensated for by the losses suered by the poorer regions (Ferrario and Zanardi, 2011) . This is especially true when income is distributed unevenly at regional level. In Section 2, we present our model and dene a threshold in terms of regional income disparity above which claims for more devolution may be driven by a reduction in solidarity.
The model
We examine devolution in a two-region (i ∈ {A, B}) economy in which a local public good (g i ) with spillovers is produced. The total cost for producing g i is v i g i (i.e., there are no xed costs). Each region is endowed with an income Y i and A is wealthier and more ecient than B, that is, Y A > Y B and v A < v B .
Preferences for the local public good are assumed to be homogeneous within each local authority. The total population is standardised to one and both regions have the same size, that is, each has a population equal to 1 2 . If a linear tax τ i is levied on local income, the welfare function for each region can be written as
where λ i is a public good preference parameter. As in Besley and Coate (2003) , the value of α i ∈ 0, 1 2 determines the level of spillovers: for α i = 0, the good is a local public good; for α i = 1 2 , it is a public good; and for
, it is a local public good with spillovers.
Centralized provision is nanced through a uniform tax whose rateτ = τ A = τ B is such that the budget constraint is satised, as follows.
while decentralized provision has two sources of nance: a local tax τ i and an equalization grant G i distributed in a lump sum, as suggested by Dahlby and Wilson (1994) and Smart (1998) . Thus, each region has the following budget constraint
The grant G i may be a combination of two kinds of grant:
• Expenditure based:
• Resource based:
whereτ (as in (2)) is the tax rate at which the central government decides to equalize resources; usually, this is correlated with a standard level of services (Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008) , and a is the degree of equalization that the government wishes to pursue. We assume that in a centralized state, a = 1, while in a decentralized structure, its value may fall below 1. In both cases, the grant of one region equals the opposite of the other region's grant (i.e.,
Thus, we can write
where β ∈ {0, 1}: with β = 0, the grant is expenditure based; for β = 1, it is resource based. Even if actual systems use a combination of both grants (Blöchliger and Charbit, 2008) , we consider only pure forms. In Section 3, we examine two dierent settings: (i) centralization: the maximization of
(1) by a centralized decision maker, which takes into account the welfare of both regions and (ii) devolution: the maximization of (1) is performed independently by each region.
Centralization versus devolution
Centralization means that the central authority sets the optimal provision of the public good for both regions by maximising the sum of their welfare.
Thus, the problem can be written as
Devolution means that each region maximizes its own welfare; the problem of region i can be written as
under the constraint
For decentralization, we assume the presence of scal illusion, that is, local authorities do not perceive the eects that their expenditure decisions have on the equalization grant. The solutions are summarized in Table 1 and their derivations are presented in Appendix A.
As expected, the quantity of public good produced in a centralized model is greater than that produced in a decentralized one. This is because the centralized solution takes into account the spillover eects that are ignored in devolution. However, the welfare of the richer region may be higher in 
decentralization if the scal ow from A to B is suciently reduced. If the grant is expenditure based, the decentralized solution implies a reduction in expenditure, which, in turn, causes a reduction in the equalization grant. As a result, the wealthier region has more income to buy private goods; hence, the welfare loss deriving from suboptimal provision of the public good has to be weighted against the increase in disposable income. A similar process may result from the choice of the value of a, that is, the degree of equalization that the central government wants to pursue. The lower a is, the lower the scal ow from A to B is, and the higher the incentive for Region A is to ask for decentralization.
We now examine the case in which resources are equalized using an expenditure-based grant. The presence of the grant does not allow us to conclude that centralization is a Pareto-superior solution to devolution. In fact, the income distribution between regions should be suciently uneven for the wealthier region to be better o with devolution. In Appendix B, we
show that this occurs when the Gini coecient is suciently high, that is,
where the threshold Z EB can be written as
The right-hand side of Equation (8) 
and the simplied threshold can be plotted as in Figure 1 .
In this case, the threshold Z EB is 0.193 (α = 0.5: a public good in the denition of Besley and Coate) and 0 (α = 0: a local public good). This threshold may be used for an evaluation of the claims for devolution: the higher GIN I is, the stronger is the demand for devolution from rich local authorities, which also implies a reduction in solidarity.
If the grant is resource based and its amount does not depend on the 
Note that 1 1−a ≥ 1, and thus, from (10) Z RB > Z EB . For a = 1, the expression has no nite solution. In fact, in this case, the equalization grant in devolution is equal to the implicit grant paid by the rich local authority to the poor one in centralization. This means that the only eect of decentralization in this case is a reduction in the provision of the local public good, which causes a welfare loss.
Discussion and policy implications
Our framework may oer an alternative interpretation to the recent claims for more devolution at local level. In particular, they may derive from a reduction in solidarity among regions rather than an eciency improvement in producing local public goods. Blöchliger and Charbit (2008) show that:
(i) several systems are available, (ii) they often coexist, and (iii) only a few systems use pure resource-based equalization grants. In the presence of an expenditure-based equalization grant, whenever GIN I in Equation (9) is greater than Z EB , the claim may derive from a reduction in solidarity. Lessmann (2012) estimates the GIN I for some countries, while an estimation for the spillover parameter α is more dicult to obtain. In fact, the level of spillover depends on both the nature of the expenditure and local characteristics (see Revelli, 2015) . Solé-Ollé (2006) estimates an average value of spillover equal to 0.329, with a range of variation between 0.141 and 0.675, according to the type of municipality. Table 2 shows the Gini estimated by Lessmann (2012) for a sample of countries. α * in the second column is the minimum level of spillover for which the richest region prefers centralization to devolution. The third column shows the probability that a decentralization claim in each country is driven 
1
This means that for a country like Belgium (with α * = 0.495), if the grant is expenditure based, the richest region is likely to gain from decentralization only if the good produced is a public good (α = 0.5). In countries like Sweden (with α * = 0.2), the spillover threshold can be much lower for the richest region to prefer centralization. The gures in Table 2 allow us to conclude that decentralization is often advocated in countries where dierences in regional income are signicant (Belgium, Italy, and Latin American countries). In these countries, the observed reduction in regional redistribution is the objective that local Governments want to pursue rather than it being a consequence of scal federalism. The only signicant exception is the UK, where decentralization is advocated by poorer regions. In this case, historical reasons may prevail over economic factors.
When equalization is resource based, the policy implications of our ndings are interesting. First, if the central government does not change the parameters of the equalization formula (a =1), the richer region has no interest in asking for decentralization. In any case, the central government may set a at a suciently high level in Equation (10) to reduce claims deriving from reduction in solidarity. From equation 10, we can, in fact, obtain the following condition
which depends on the value of the spillover (α) and on the shape of the 1 The probability P is dened as P = α * 0.5
and, accordingly, the domain for P is [0, 1] , which can be interpreted as a probability. income distribution. Finally, our model suggests that equalization grants based on income rather than expenditure should be preferred because they reduce the strategic behavior of wealthy regions in setting low expenditure levels. In this light, both the equalization system used in Germany for healthcare and the recently implemented Swiss reform seem to be heading in the right direction A Derivation of the results presented in Table 1 A.1 Centralisation
We can substitute 5 into 4 and we can write
from which the results presented in Table 1 are obtained.
A.2 Derivation of the conditions for Decentralisation
We can substitute 7 into 6 to write:
The FOCs can be written as:
B Derivation of the welfare dierence
The optimal levels for g,G, and τ can be substituted back into equation (6) to obtain:
Analogously, we can use the results presented in Table 1 to write the optimal level of welfare for a centralised system:
In both cases, since G A = −G B , the grant has no eect on the total welfare.
Total welfare
The dierence between W C and W D is :
This dierence is positive because of the spillover eects (Tresch, 2002, Chapter 5) . The optimal quantity g * i =
leading to W D is in the set of the feasible choices for W C . This implies that if it has not been chosen, it does not maximise welfare. This result can be used to determine the sign of the dierence for each Region.
Region A For Region A the welfare dierence is
The rst term is of course positive. The sign of the dierence depends on the change in the equalisation grant which in turn depends on the income gap and on the form of equalisation chosen.
For β = 0, the grant is expenditure based and the dierence can be written as
and this dierence is negative if
When λ i = λ B = λ, the result is simplied: 
